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Abstract 
Age discrimination and the other protected characteristics are legislated, 
in the EC Treaty, as a numerus clausus of features which, despite the 
differences, enjoy equal status. Yet, age discrimination, unlike its 
counterparts, is susceptible to being ‘justified’ in force of the Framework 
Directive. The obscure and grey waters of law to which age discrimination 
has been drifting aimlessly for some time, is the subject of this paper, the 
ultimate purpose of which is, beyond the sociological and anthropological 
studies, to dissect and unearth the current inconsistencies in the European 
Union legislation as regards this notion and its interplay with the equality 
corpus iuris. As a logical outcome, the paper puts forward suggestions for 
amendments to the current Framework Directive so that its tenor can be 
aligned to the Treaty where, be this construct ontologically correct or not, 
there is no suggestion that a ranking of protected characteristics should be 
adopted. Furthermore and more intriguingly, the contribution advances a 
more radical proposal, ergo the reform of the Framework Directive so that 
this protected characteristic, in so many cases unsuccessfully pursued vis-
à-vis the national courts, be ultimately shaped in a binary way, therefore 
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‘old age discrimination’, so that its ‘promotion’ to the ‘premier league’ of  
protected characteristics can thereupon be realised.      
 
Introduction 
There can be little doubt that age discrimination is in its infancy when 
viewed from two contrasting perspectives.  
First and foremost, from a legislative point of view, this notion has 
been introduced in Europe by the Framework Directive in 2000 and, 
therefore, is a comparatively recent construct. In Britain, for instance, 
it was only in 2006, courtesy of the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006, that it was unveiled, as an additional protected 
characteristic, within a largely fragmented array of legislation at that 
time, governing over discrimination. Secondly, and of utmost 
importance to the epistemological purposes of this paper, age 
discrimination, from the stand point of its normative structure, 
remains a ‘weak’ protected characteristic when compared with the 
other non-discrimination grounds, diluted by the wide range of 
circumstances in which age is said to provide a ‘legitimate reason’ to 
distinguish between groups1.  
                                         
1 See for example: Sargeant, M., ‘Distinguishing between Justifiable Treatment 
and prohibited Discrimination in Respect of Age’, (2013), 4, Journal of Business 
Law, 398-416 and; O’Cinneide, C., ‘Age Discrimination and the European Court 
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Age is firmly enshrined in the main principles of the EU. The Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union, art 19, contemplates, 
among the protected characteristics, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, or sexual orientation and, last but not least, age. 
The same European Charter of Fundamental Rights, art 21(1), 
accounts for age, where it stipulates: 
‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a nationality minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited’ (underlining not per original 
text). 
Nevertheless in the correspondent implementing legislation, the 
characteristic at stake remains an unfulfilled achievement and a 
fledgling concept. 
Doctrinally, this alleged hierarchy of the protected characteristics 
and, therefore, the possibility that, legitimately or otherwise, the EU 
legislator has fashioned different levels (of importance) of legislated 
                                         
of Justice: EU Equality Law Comes of Age’, (2009-10), 2, Revue des Affaires 
Européennes, 253-276.  
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‘physiognomies’, has already been adumbrated at an authoritative 
level in the past, and even justified.2 
The focus of this work is not to reassess the validity of these theories, 
but rather to discuss, from a purely legal perspective, whether (i) 
there is an overlap between the concept of ‘justification’, relating to 
age, and the notion of an ‘occupational requirement’, applicable to 
all the protected characteristics, and (ii) the EC Treaty has 
deliberately relegated age discrimination to a ‘secondary league’. 
More specifically, if it was demonstrated that, from a legal point of 
view, the application of art 6 to only one of the protected 
characteristics – age - is incompatible with the aims of the Treaty, a 
prospective re-wording of the Framework Directive governing the 
area of discrimination shall be required, with an omission of what – 
according to this paper – is the redundant and unnecessary presence 
of its art 6 (ergo, the justification of direct age discrimination). 
Ultimately, if this work was successful in achieving this objective, 
doctrinally, the astute inference, adumbrated in the past, that age 
                                         
2 Among the others, E Howard, ‘The Case for a Considered Hierarchy of 
Discrimination Grounds in EU Law’ (2006)13 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 443.   
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discrimination has been relegated to a lower tier of protected 
characteristics, shall be further corroborated.    
 
Age discrimination and EU legislation 
 
The principle of equal treatment is well defined at EU level with Art 
2 of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC prohibiting both direct 
discrimination: the less favourable treatment of an individual on the 
basis of a protected characteristic; and indirect discrimination: where 
an individual having a protected characteristic is disadvantaged by 
an apparently neutral provision. Among the array of protected 
characteristics, age discrimination presents a noticeable and distinct 
characteristic: unlike all the other protected characteristics, direct 
age discrimination can be ‘justified’.  
In essence, according to article 6 of the Framework Directive3 there 
might be a ‘justification of differences of treatment on grounds of 
age’; more specifically: 
‘Member States may provide that differences of treatment on 
grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the 
                                         
3 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L303). 
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context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified 
by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour 
market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’4 
The same recital 25 of the Framework Directive states that 
differences on the grounds of age may be justified, although the 
prohibition of age discrimination still remains an ‘essential part’ of 
the European employment strategy.5  
                                         
4 The EU legislation (art 6(2)) goes on to further clarify the details of this 
possible justification: 
‘Such differences of treatment may include, among others: 
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational 
training, employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration 
conditions, for young people, older workers and persons with caring 
responsibilities in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure 
their protection; 
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or 
seniority in service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked 
to employment; 
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the training 
requirements of the post in question or the need for a reasonable period of 
employment before retirement.’ 
5 S Deakin and SG Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 655.  
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In turn, the principle of ‘justification’ has been encapsulated in the 
various domestic legislations across Europe, for instance in Britain. 
In the British legislation, Section 13(2) of the Equality Act 2010 
stipulates as follows: 
‘If the protected characteristic is age, A does not discriminate 
against B if A can show A’s treatment of B to be a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ 
Despite the concept of justification being enshrined in the British 
legislation, Scholars are unclear as to how widely this applies vis-à-
vis the courts.6 A narrow interpretation is anticipated and the cases 
resolved thus far (relating to enhanced redundancy schemes7 as well 
as points for long service in a redundancy selection process8) seem 
to justify this assumption.      
Yet, article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, in legislating on 
the concept of ‘occupational requirements’, applies an element of 
justification to all the protected characteristics, including age. To this 
end, such a norm stipulates as follows:  
                                         
6 I Smith and A Baker, Smith’s & Wood’s Employment Law (11th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 404. 
7 MacCulloch v ICI [2008] All ER (D) 81. 
8 Rolls Royce v UNITE [2008] All ER (D) 174. 
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‘Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may 
provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a 
characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 
shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of 
the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in 
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the 
objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.’ 
Additionally, applicable to both the ‘justification’ and the 
‘occupational requirements’, the EU legal provisions clarify the 
specific legitimate differences of treatment (article 6(2)) or the 
genuine occupational requirements (article 4) that, albeit 
ontologically discriminatory, do not give rise to any direct or indirect 
discrimination.  
In both cases, the matter is devolved to the national legislator. 
Whilst the Framework Directive provides little insight as to what may 
constitute an occupational requirement outwith the requirements of 
a religious organisation, it provides some helpful guidelines in 
consideration of the ‘justifications’ of age discrimination. As to the 
latter, it is highlighted that they may comprise ‘the setting of age-
related conditions on access to employment and vocational training 
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which are designed to promote vocational integration or to protect 
the workers concerned, the fixing of minimum conditions of age, 
professional experience or seniority for access to employment or 
employment-related benefits; and the fixing of maximum ages for 
recruitment where this is based on training requirements or on the 
need for a ‘reasonable period of employment before retirement’’.9 
In contrast with the element of ‘justification’, the occupational 
requirements under the ‘counterpart’ art. 4 of the Framework 
Directive are somewhat vague as to what may constitute a genuine 
occupational requirement (GOR).10 This has given rise to a narrow 
interpretation of what may constitute a GOR in the British courts. 
Current examples of what may constitute a genuine occupational 
requirement include; where an actor is required to be of a certain 
age11, for the purpose of safeguarding national security or complying 
with a statutory provision12, or, in limited circumstances, where 
measures are taken to alleviate the disadvantage of a group sharing 
a particular protected characteristic13. The narrow construal of the 
GOR concept has led to a reluctance by organisations to rely on this 
                                         
9 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (n 4) 656. 
10 In fact, art. 4(2) am 4(3) are dedicated to the specific interplay between GOR 
and religion, without setting out a generic list.  
11 Department of Trade and Industry, Equality and Diversity, ‘Coming of Age’ 
(2005). 
12 Sch 9. Of the EA 2010. 
13 S.158 of the EA 2010. 
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defense. However, in relation to age, this provides little benefit with 
the lower thresholds of ‘objective justification’ providing an 
unassailable defense for organisations engaging in seemingly 
discriminatory conduct, arguably, undermining the general principle 
of equal treatment. 
 
Shortcomings and flaws in the way age discrimination is 
legislated in the European Union 
The combined reading of art 4 and art 6 engenders a number 
of considerations of a legal nature. 
First and foremost, age discrimination seems to be subject to 
a double whammy. Not only can it be ‘justified’ as an “occupational 
requirement” (art. 4), but also it can be objectively ‘justified’ 
(according to art. 6). In light of this different regime (a “regular” one 
for all the other protected characteristics, and a ‘special’ one for that 
relating to age), it is insightful to delve behind the black letter of the 
legislation and, ultimately, understand what art. 6 (as a special 
“justification” for age) really adds in comparison to what art. 4 already 
provides by way of its wording. 
Two observations are necessary in this respect, in facilitating 
a comprehensive analysis of the norm at stake (art. 4 of the 
Framework directive). 
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The notion of occupational requirements does not make a 
distinction among the protected characteristics and employers may 
rely on it irrespective of the discriminatory conducts (ie direct 
discrimination or indirect discrimination). It can be ascertained that 
the equal application of this defense across the protected 
characteristics appears consistent with the principles of equality 
promoted by the Framework Directive. 
Secondly, from a substantive law point of view, the 
occupational requirement is a requirement that the employer may 
attach to a role despite potentially impacting on - or interfering with - 
a protected characteristic; the requirement shall be nonetheless 
legitimate for the reason that, although the outcome of it results in a 
discriminatory act, the objective is ‘legitimate’ and the requirement is 
‘proportionate’14.  
Having clarified the concepts of both ‘justification’, applicable 
exclusively to age, and ‘occupational requirement’, applicable to all 
the protected characteristics, including age, it may be suggested that 
the two concepts are similar with a requirement for proof of both 
legitimacy and proportionality, in their application. However, it can 
                                         
14 Sch. 9 EA 2010. 
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be affirmed - and this is the theory that this paper seeks to 
demonstrate - that the ‘justification’ serves little function other than 
to weaken the protection from discrimination on the grounds of age 
by providing a greater range of circumstances in which such 
discriminatory behaviour may be justified. Whilst the defense of GOR 
is deliberately limited in relation to the suitability or competence of 
the individual to perform their role, the defense of justification is 
subject to no such limits instead allowing for a seemingly unbounded 
adoption of discriminatory practices based on the pursuit of 
equivocal ‘employment policy or labour market objectives15’. It is this 
distinction which serves to relegate age to the lower echelons of the 
non-discrimination grounds. 
 
A critical re-assessment of the main age discrimination cases 
In deliberating over the decisa of the European Court of 
Justice relating to age discrimination, the perplexities raised in the 
previous section concerning the manner in which this protected 
characteristic is legislated upon seem to be confirmed, rather than 
dispelled.  
                                         
15 Art 6 of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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A possible terrain of analysis ripe for potentially corroborating 
the subtle theory of this paper is the reading of the relatively recent 
case of C-144/04 Mangold16 where it was held by the ECJ, in a 
somewhat controversial decision, that age should not be treated any 
differently from the other protected characteristics and the 
prohibition of age discrimination should be applied with similar rigour 
as to the other forms of anti-discrimination norms. This decision 
appears to be in direct conflict with the framework Directive which 
sees a distinction between age and the remaining protected 
characteristics, through the restricted application of art 6.  
Furthermore, in the more recent case of C-555/07 
Kukudeveci17, the decision in Mangold was confirmed and the 
general concept of equal treatment across the protected 
characteristics has been further reinforced. In fact, the importance of 
the general principle of equal treatment has seen a divergence by 
the courts in their application of the Directive.  Whilst traditionally 
Directives have deliberately not been given ‘horizontal direct effect’ 
within national law in relation to private disputes, the Kukudeveci 
case appears to depart from this precedent confirming that ‘national 
                                         
16 [2005] ECR I-9981. 
17 [2010] IRLR 346. 
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courts must disapply domestic laws and other areas of EU law in the 
case of conflict with the general principle of equal treatment’18. This 
would indicate, prima facie, that with regards to age discrimination, 
art 6 should be ‘disapplied’ due to the apparent interference with the 
dominant principle of equal treatment.  
This apparent departure from the direct application of the 
Equal Treatment Directive and the separation of age from the 
remaining non-discrimination grounds, further ‘muddies the water’ in 
the determination of an age discrimination case, reinforcing the need 
to address the presence of the ‘rogue’ art 6. 
A further case worthy of analysis in reviewing the necessity of 
art 6 is the case of Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa19. The dispute arose 
from a collective agreement and its specific provision in force of 
which the pilots of the German flag-ship air carrier (the defendant 
Lufthansa) had to comply with a default automatic retirement age of 
60. This conflicted with national legislation allowing pilots to work 
beyond the threshold of 60 and up to a limit of 65, so long as they 
                                         
18 For a discussion of the case see, O’Cinneide, C., ‘Age Discrimination and the 
European Court of Justice: EU Equality Law Comes of Age’, (2009-10), 2, Revue 
des Affaires Européennes, 253-276. 
19 [2012] ICR 716. 
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were accompanied by at least a pilot, as a member of the crew, aged 
less than 60. The collective agreement was regarded as unjustified.  
However, one cannot deny that the same identical result (therefore, 
invalidity of the collective agreement due to conflict with national 
statute) could have ostensibly been achieved through the application 
of art 4 of the Framework Directive, relating to the occupational 
requirement. Ergo, although there is a difference in the treatment of 
pilots on the grounds of age,20 this cannot fall within the concept of 
occupational requirement (or, to use a correspondent methodology, 
cannot be justified), due to the fact that the objective is not legitimate 
and the means of achieving this objective, through the stipulation of 
a maximum age in relation to the particular post, is not proportionate.   
Thus in re-interpreting this case through the proposed reasoning of 
this paper, there is no reason for doubting that the result would have 
been alike if the events had been interpreted in light of the sole 
occupational requirement concept, rather than the additional and 
arguable unnecessary, element of justification.  
 
Age and retirement age 
                                         
20 Pilots to retire before 60. 
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Under EU statute as it currently stands, age is formally a 
neutral protected characteristic, applicable to the full range of 
different age groups. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that the 
first ‘casualty’ of the prohibition to discriminate on the grounds of age 
has been the elimination of the default age limit for retirement21, 
entailed to which was (and still is) the purpose to stimulate and 
increase the participation ‘of the elderly in the labour market’.22     
In reality, in reading the EU legislation, both age and 
retirement age should be fully disarticulated from one another, in 
light of the fact that, according to Recital no 14 of the Framework 
Directive, the EU piece of legislation ‘shall be without prejudice to 
national provisions laying down retirement ages’. This appears to be 
reinforced in the landmark ECJ case of C-411/05 Palacios de la 
Villa23 where the court confirmed that the Framework Directive is to 
be ‘without prejudice to national provisions laying down retirement 
ages’ and that the creation of labour market opportunities provides a 
                                         
21 In Britain, this has occurred in force of the Employment Equality 
(Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011. The compulsory 
retirement age has been phased out starting from April 2011. 
22 D Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context. Text and Materials (n 10) 419. 
23 [2007] IRLR 989. 
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‘legitimate aim’, in the interest of public policy, which justifies the 
stipulation of retirement ages where the means are proportionate.  
Similarly in the case of C-45/09 Rosenbladt24 where a 
collective agreement setting a mandatory retirement age of 65 was 
called into question, the court reaffirmed that retirement age ‘was a 
reflection of political and social consensus’ based on the notion of 
‘sharing employment between the generations’. This was held to be 
advantageous as it removed the need to dismiss older employees on 
the grounds of capability which would be ‘humiliating for those which 
have reached an advanced age’.  
Upon review of the EU legislation and the ensuing case law it 
can be ascertained that there may be wide range of ‘legitimate aims’ 
which may justify the stipulation of a compulsory retirement age and 
it is for the national courts to determine the equity of such measures. 
However, with a wide range of social and economic objectives which 
may be considered ‘legitimate’ and a lack of guidance as to what age 
may be considered proportionate in achieving these aims, there can 
be said to be an extensive range of circumstances which could 
objectively justify mandatory retirement.  
                                         
24 [2010] ECR I-9391. 
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Whilst the social and economic sensitivity of mandatory 
retirement rules, and their importance to issues such as 
intergenerational fairness, have been well documented25, it has been 
put forward that, in order to effectively achieve the aims of anti-
discrimination legislation, this must be more effectively balanced 
against the interests of some employees to continue in 
employment26. In order to address this imbalance it is proposed that 
a more effective mechanism for measuring the legitimacy of 
retirement rules, at an individual level, would be the application of 
art 4 and the genuine occupational requirements. In this case, any 
age based requirements would have to be measured in accordance 
with the capability or suitability of the individual to continue in the 
role. This would narrow down the discretion of Member States, 
currently amplified by the unnecessary art 6, in determining the 
legitimacy of retirement rules in specific occupations, removing the 
                                         
25 See for example; Fredman, S., & Spencer, S, ‘Age as an Equality Issue’ [2003], 
Hart publishing, Oxford, eds. 
26 Schlacter, M, ‘Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination under EU Law’, 
[2011], The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 27 (3), p 287 – 299.  
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ability to rely upon ‘mere assertions or generalisations’27 to justify 
differences of treatment. 
 
Age discrimination: Genuine Occupational Requirement v 
Justification 
In switching attention to the national decisa in the matter of 
age discrimination and the dual concepts of justification/occupational 
requirement, it can be argued that the GOR defense, applicable to 
all protected characteristics, satisfies the requirement to afford a 
level of discretion to the employer to distinguish between different 
groups in pursuit of some legitimate social or economic objective.  
The case of Seldon,28 correctly regarded as the paradigm upon 
which justified age discrimination receives guidance, seems to 
confirm the subtle line of reasoning of this contribution. The relevant 
dispute originated from the practice of a law firm to require its 
partners to retire at 65. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the 
decision of the ET which justified this practice, mainly on the basis 
that associates, usually younger, would have thus been afforded 
                                         
27 Dewhurst, E, ‘Will you till need me? Will you still feed me? When im Sixty-
four’ [2013], European Law Journal, 19(4), 517-544. 
28 Seldon v Clarkson, Write & Jakes [2009] IRLR 267. 
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better prospects of promotion.29 In reality, in this case as in the 
previous one, if the facts occurred had been subsumed under art 4 
of the Framework Directive, the results would have been identical: 
ergo, the stipulation of a retirement age of 65 as an occupational 
requirement, for the reason that it is legitimate and it achieves a 
legitimate aim.  Furthermore, the successful application of the GOR 
defense, and the negation of art 6 in relation to mandatory retirement 
age, has recently been reinforced in the ECJ case of C-229/08 Wolf 
v Stadt Frankfurt30 where it was held that a maximum retirement age 
of 30 set by the Frankfurt fire service, was a genuine occupational 
requirement and thus was not an act of age discrimination. Thus it 
can again be asserted that the presence of both art 4 and art 6 is 
superfluous with art 4 sufficient in determining justifiable age based 
distinctions.  
   
Possible re-think of the EU legislation in the matter of age 
Age discrimination is professed to belong to a second tier of 
protected characteristics or, to put it even more bluntly, to the lowest 
                                         
29 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (n 4) 661.  
30 [2010] IRLR 244. 
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echelon of the scale.31 Although this paper may adequately validate 
this theory as legislation stands (particularly in light of the 
Framework Directive), the present analysis adheres to the 
hypothesis that, in reality, there is no legal argument for this 
hierarchy to exist, in light of the main principles of the EU Treaty.  
These principles contemplate, in accordance with an equal 
weighting of importance, the various protected characteristics, 
including age, and without exception.32 With the controversial 
‘justification’, the Framework Directive, de facto, downgrades and 
demotes the protected characteristic of age. If it is true that art 13 
EC ‘empowers the European Council to take appropriate action to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
                                         
31 E Howard (n 1) 467. It is annotated by the Author that the ‘European Court of 
Human Rights does not consider age to be a suspect ground and age should not 
become a suspect ground in EU law either’ (ibid. 466). It is added that age ‘is a 
characteristic that can affect the ability and the availability to do a job or use a 
good or service, and exceptions will remain necessary.’ (ibid. 466,467).  
32 More in detail, article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of 
the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ 
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or belief, disability age and sexual orientation,’33 the attitude of the 
EU secondary legislation (the Directives) in differentiating between 
age (justified) and the other protected characteristics appears bereft 
of any legal grounds. In this respect, a corroboration of this 
assumption lies on the interpretation of the same principles of the 
Treaty. In empowering the European Council to take action, the array 
of protected characteristics are not linked to one another by way of 
the conjunction ‘or’, but rather with the alternative ‘and’.34 
In terms of mere exegesis, this paper has hopefully succeeded 
in demonstrating that art 6 of the Framework Directive does not add 
anything valuable to the notion of ‘occupational requirement’, a 
concept already in circulation for all the protected characteristics. 
Actually, its only ratio essendi would be to reinforce - not without a 
sense of sadism and brutality - a suggestion: ergo age discrimination 
must equate to the ‘black sheep’ of the protected characteristics. 
                                         
33 E Howard (n 1) 445. 
34 Because of this ‘and’, if action is taken for one of the protected characteristics, 
likewise it will happen for the other ones. The use of the conjunction ‘or’ would 
have allowed the opposite interpretation, therefore the apportioning of the action 
by the European Council in a different way per each protected characteristic. 
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This approach, in the view of this paper, does not find a conceptual 
bearing in the Treaty.  
Admittedly, an opposing view is expressed by those35 who 
authoritatively contend that ‘maintaining a hierarchy of legal 
protection at EU level is justified, but that this hierarchy should be 
based on whether a ground for discrimination should be considered 
suspect or not, using the distinction made by the European Court of 
Human Rights. A ground should be considered suspect if it concerns 
a core human right which is strongly linked to human dignity or to the 
political process. If a ground is suspect, the EU legislation should 
cover a wide area and contain only limited and prescribed 
exceptions, thus leaving less to the discretion of the Member States. 
… .’   
As the law should be (de iure ferenda), nothing prevents the EU 
legislature from omitting from the Framework Directive its 
controversial article 6. Actually, this paper prescribes a conclusion 
that this omission is not an option for the legislator, but rather an 
imperative task, given the legal principles of the Treaty. As hopefully 
demonstrated in this contribution, article 4 (occupational 
                                         
35 E Howard (n 1) 469. 
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requirements) may already suffice for purposes of a ‘justification’, 
relevant to all the protected characteristics. To such an end, the 
empirical re-reading of some decisa of the EU Court of Justice, 
viewed through the lens of article 4, has sparked off conclusions not 
different to those achieved through the application of the contentious 
article 6.   
 
Is age discrimination as a binary protected characteristic the 
right approach? 
An even more radical endeavor of reform would be, prospectively, 
the departure from the traditional configuration of age as a ‘binary’ 
protected characteristic;36 so long as the numerus clausus of the 
protected characteristics is maintained in the current EU framework, 
the concept of age discrimination shall be shaped, more realistically, 
solely and exclusively on the concept of ‘old age’ discrimination. The 
genesis itself of this protected characteristic only serves to add 
                                         
36 Emphasis on the non-binary flavour of age discrimination is placed for 
instance in Britain, in the case Seldon v Clarkson, Wright & Jakes [2012] ICR 
716. 
As per Baroness Hale’s statements (Seldon v Clarkson, Wright & Jakes [2012] 
UKSC 16, para 4): ‘Age is not a “binary” in nature… but a continuum which 
changes over time.’ 
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credence to this conclusion: from the Council Decision dated 22 
February 1999, and its accompanying Guidelines, where a policy 
based on the ageing population (our emphasis) was highlighted for 
the first time, to the following revision of 2005,37 where a ‘new 
intergenerational approach’ is heralded, it would appear that the 
inspiration for the EU policy in this matter has been an elderly people 
disadvantage, as opposed to a young age advantage. Yet, the 
original philosophy underpinning age discrimination has not filtered 
through to the legislation, where conversely the protected 
characteristic has become - probably fallaciously - a generic concept 
of age, still undefined, and age groups, entirely indefinable.    
In all likelihood, this, as well as the manner in which age 
discrimination is shaped across the Atlantic, could encourage a 
radically new way to legislate on age discrimination in the European 
Union also. 
 
In stark contrast to the relatively recent Framework Directive and its 
subsequent implementation within the domestic legislation of the UK, 
by way firstly of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 
                                         
37 Council Decision 2005/600 (OJ [2005] L205/21). 
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and later within the Equality Act 2010, the U.S. is just two years short 
of heralding the 50th anniversary of the prohibition of age 
discrimination under Federal Law.38 Whilst the Framework Directive 
emphasised the requirement that age be protected across the board, 
irrespective of the age group concerned, and thus failed to account 
for the predictable outcome that age discrimination became fused 
with retirement age, the binary nature of the ADEA made no secret 
of the fact that its intention was to protect the more elderly members 
of the workforce. The U.S. Code Section 621, to that end, stated the 
intention of the ADEA to: 
‘Promote employment of older persons based on their 
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination 
in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of 
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on 
employment.’ 
                                         
38 The first Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed by 
Congress in 1967. However, a succession of individual States had implemented 
statutes from the 1930s so that by the 1960s as many as eight had legislation 
prohibiting against age discrimination. 
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The binary characteristic of the ADEA in its original format39 offered 
protection against age discrimination to those in the 40-6540 age 
bracket and also prohibited acts of age discrimination within that 
bracket. In other words, an act of discrimination against an individual 
in that age range where a younger individual, also in that age range, 
is favoured is also prohibited. A series of amendments to the original 
ADEA followed41 with those of particular significance being the 1978 
amendments which resulted in the protected age bracket being 
widened to 40-70, thus increasing the mandatory retirement age to 
70; the 1986 amendments removed an upper age limit entirely and 
thus abolished mandatory retirement. 
 
Conclusion  
The Framework Directive was immediately undermined, in 
regard to its stated objective, by affording age discrimination the 
dubious distinction of being the only protected characteristic to be 
‘watered down’ by a series of conditions under which employers 
                                         
39 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 1967. 
40 In accordance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
1967, retirement was mandatory at the age of 65. 
41 Amendments were made to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) 1967 in 1978, 1979 and 1986.  
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could justify such acts. In this regard, the UK and U.S. legislations 
demonstrate a shared characteristic. The latter states justification to 
be an ‘umbrella’ principle covering the following four possible 
defences on the part of the employer: ‘where age is a Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the 
operation of the business; where the action is based on reasonable 
factors other than age; where the action is in observance of a bona 
fide employee benefit plan; where the employer has good cause to 
discipline or discharge the employee’. 
Finally, although from a purely speculative point of view, it is 
worth acknowledging that the ADEA 1967 formed part of a watershed 
decade in U.S. Federal legislation in which the Equal Pay Act 1963 
and Civil Rights Act 1964 represented further cornerstones of rights 
conferred on individuals. In that respect, it is perhaps surprising that 
age discrimination in the U.S. did not assume a place of equal 
standing with the other protected characteristics. However, its binary 
nature did at least give it an element of parity. In contrast, the 
European legislation and UK national statute, where the protected 
characteristic of age arrived on the scene 40-50 years after those 
related to sex and race, is palpable. Perhaps it is not entirely 
surprising that age discrimination has been confined to the lower 
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leagues of EU and British legislation whilst it is equipped with the 
binary tools to make its presence felt in the upper echelons of U.S. 
legislation.         
